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Abstract—Physical unclonable functions (PUFs), as hardware security primitives, exploit manufacturing randomness to extract
hardware instance-specific secrets. One of most popular structures is time-delay based Arbiter PUF attributing to large number of
challenge response pairs (CRPs) yielded and its compact realization. However, modeling building attacks threaten most variants of
APUFs that are usually employed for strong PUF-oriented application—lightweight authentication—without reliance on the securely
stored digital secrets based standard cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we investigate a reconfigurable latent obfuscation
technique endowed PUF construction, coined as OB-PUF, to maintain the security of elementary PUF CRPs enabled authentication
where a CRP is never used more than once. The obfuscation—determined by said random patterns—conceals and distorts the
relationship between challenge-response pairs capable of thwarting a model building adversary needing to know the exact relationship
between challenges and responses. A bit further, the obfuscation is hidden and reconfigured on demand, in other words, the patterns
are not only invisible but also act as one-time pads that are only employed once per authentication around and then discarded. As a
consequence, the OB-PUF demonstrates significant resistance to the recent revealed powerful Evaluation Strategy (ES) based
modeling attacks where the direct relationship between challenge and response is even not a must. The OB-PUF’s uniqueness and
reliability metrics are also systematically studied followed by formal authentication capability evaluations.
Index Terms—Reconfigurable OB-PUF, obfuscation, CMA-ES attacks, hardware security, authentication.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MOST current security solutions resort to storing adigital secret key in non-volatile memory (NVM) that
remains hidden to an adversary. However, this requirement
is difficult to realize in practice. Firstly, invasive techniques,
e.g., semi-invasive methods and side channel attacks, may
extract valuable key information [1], [2]. Secondly, malware
such as Trojan horses or viruses can read out and transfer
keys unbeknownst to users [2]. Furthermore, lightweight
and mobile devices such as smart cards, Internet-of-Things
(IoT) devices and radio-frequency identification (RFID) la-
bels may have no dedicated room for key protection as func-
tionality and cost consideration mostly dominate security
requirements in commercial scenarios [2].
The PUF offers a cost-effective alternative to building
security services such as authentication or identification
without the need to store secure keys in NVM [3], [4], [5].
A PUF extracts secrets on demand from unclonable and
uncontrollable process variations resulting from manufac-
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turing processes when the PUF is stimulated by an input
signal (challenge).
Among all silicon based PUFs, Arbiter PUF (APUF) [3],
[6] receives extensive attentions as it holds the promise to
serve as a strong PUF that yields an exponential number
of challenge response pairs (CRPs). This desirable property
enables a lightweight authentication mechanism based on
CRPs. Though recent modeling attacks threaten such an
elementary strong PUF-oriented application [7], [8], [9],
[10], the pursuit of a strong PUF-oriented lightweight entity
authentication circuit has persisted and such a realization
is regarded as an open problem in the face of plausible
modeling attacks, [11], [10], [12], [31]. The most recent
work from Yu et al. use a lockdown technique to prevent
modeling attacks by enforcing and upper-bounding the
available number of CRPs by an adversary in a trade-off
of the available authentication rounds [12].
We continue the investigation of a such strong PUF to
support a lightweight authentication protocol and aim to
eliminate the need to limit authentication rounds in [12]
while showing heuristic security against modeling attacks.
This article builds upon our preliminary work [5] to con-
struct an OB-PUF. The OB-PUF obscures the relationship
between the challenges and responses using a selected pat-
tern vectors—shall be clear in Section 3—securely gener-
ated by the trusted party—server—and the OB-PUF em-
bedded device. By exploiting the proposed reconfigurable
obfuscation technique, the reconfigurable OB-PUF shows
significantly increased resilience to modeling attacks, even
the most powerful ES attacks where knowledge of direct
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2relationship between challenge and response is not a must.
We summarize the contributions of this work below:
• We hide and reconfigure the obfuscation—
determined by the pattern vectors—between
the challenge and response, this prevents recent
revealed powerful ES based modeling attacks.
• We further implement response obfuscation besides
the challenge obfuscation already considered in our
previous work [5] in order to balance the Hamming
weight of the obfuscated responses, which eliminates
potential ES attacks based on Hamming weight en-
abled fittest objective as detailed in Section 5.3.3.
• We develop a server-aided authentication mecha-
nism that exploits the resourcefulness of a server to
not only conduct successful authentication but re-
configure the obfuscation between the challenge and
response on demand. We evaluate the authentication
capability of OB-PUF primitives through a system-
atic study of its inter-distance and intra-distance,
and subsequently, its false acceptance rate and false
rejection rate in the authentication mechanism. In
comparison with the most recent work [12], the OB-
PUF unlimits the available authentication rounds.
• We evaluate the heuristic security of reconfigurable
OB-PUF primitives against modeling attacks, specif-
ically, recently revealed powerful ES attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
introduces background and related work. Section 3 presents
the proposed challenge-response obfuscation method and
the corresponding method to recover the challenge and
response and details their implementations. Section 4 sys-
tematically analyses the authentication power/capability of
the OB-PUF under different cost, security and performance
settings; Section 5 executes modeling attack tests to evaluate
the enhanced security of reconfigurable OB-PUFs through
extensive studies; and Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Physical Unclonable Functions
When a PUF is stimulated by a challenge (input), C, a
corresponding response (output), R, will be generated and
determined by f(C), where f(·) is a physical function
that is unique and inherent to each device. Given the
same challenge, C, different PUFs with the same design
produce diverse responses, R. The challenge, C, and its
corresponding response, R, are commonly referred to as a
challenge response pair (CRP). Over the years, a number
of PUF structures have been proposed, built and analyzed.
Popular PUF designs include time delay based Arbiter PUF
(APUF) [13], [14], [15], Ring-Oscillator PUF [3] (RO-PUF);
Memory-based PUFs leveraging device mismatch such as
SRAM PUF [16], [17], [18]. Comprehensive reviews of dif-
ferent PUF architectures are referred to [19], [11], [20].
Examples of PUFs that build upon linear additive units
include APUF [1], [3], [21] and k-sum (RO-sum) PUF [22],
[19]. They have one key desirable feature, generating expo-
nential number of CPRs. Further, the hardware implementa-
tion is simple and the area overhead is small, especially the
Figure 1. An arbiter PUF (APUF) circuit.
APUF. However, the major shortcoming is their vulnerabil-
ity to modeling attacks. From a modeling attack perspective,
both architectures have the same topology (constructed
from linear additive blocks), therefore in this paper, the
APUF is used for demonstration and description. Our work
exploits the vulnerability of APUFs to modeling attacks.
Therefore, we introduce the APUF next.
2.2 Modeling APUF
The APUF consists of k stages of two 2-input multiplexers
as shown in Fig. 1, or any other units forming two signal
paths. To generate a response bit, a signal is applied to the
first stage input, while the challenge C determines the signal
path to the next stage. The input signal will race through
each multiplexer path (top and bottom paths) in parallel
with each other. At the end of the APUF architecture, an
arbiter, e.g., a latch, determines whether the top or bottom
signal arrives first and hence results in a logic ‘0’ or ‘1’
accordingly.
It has been shown that an APUF can be modelled via a
linear additive model because a response bit is generated
by comparing the summation of each time delay segment
in each stage (two 2-input multiplexers) depending on the
challenge C, where C is made up of (c1||c2||...||ck) [8],
[6], [7]. Following the notations in [8], [7], the final delay
difference tdif between these two paths is expressed as:
tdif = ω
TΦ, (1)
where ω and Φ are the delay determined vector and the
parity vector, respectively, of dimension k + 1 as a function
of C. We denote σ1/0i as the delay in stage i for the crossed
(ci = 1) and uncrossed (ci = 0) signal path through the
multiplexers, respectively. Hence σ1i is the delay of stage i
when ci = 1, while σ0i is the delay of stage i when ci = 0.
Then
ω = (ω1, ω2 ... ωk, ωk+1)T , (2)
where ω1 = σ
0
1−σ11
2 , ω
i =
σ0i−1+σ
1
i−1+σ
0
i−σ1i
2 for all i = 2, ..., k
and ωk+1 = σ
0
k+σ
1
k
2 , also
Φ(C) = (Φ1(C), ...,Φk(C),1)T, (3)
where Φj(C) = Πki=j (1− 2ci) for j = 1, ..., k. This Φ(C) is
also referred as the challenge feature.
Here we can see that the ω encodes the delays for
the subcomponents in the APUF stages, while the Φ is
a challenge feature as a function of c1, ..., ck. The delay
difference, tdif , is the inner product of ω and Φ. If tdif is
greater than 0, the response bit is ‘1’, otherwise, the response
bit is ‘0’.
32.3 CMA-ES Attacks
Recently, Becker et al. extensively investigated the CMA-
ES based modeling attacks [9], [10]. In general, to attack
an APUF, initially a randomly generated ω, that is a k + 1
length delay time vector, imitates the time delay model of
an APUF. Such a ω serves as a parent, many offspring delay
vectors are generated based on the parent and some random
mutations, e.g., random modifications of the parent delay
vector. According to a fitness metric, the best child which
maximize the fitness metric is determined and served as the
parent for the next generation. This process is repeated untill
a delay time vector of sufficient accuracy is formed.
In general, a reasonable or good fitness metric must be
defined—evaluating the goodness of the solution—to guide
the ES algorithm to the best delay time vector despite the
absence of a direct relationship between challenges and
responses.
2.4 Related Work
There are several approaches to increase the complexity
of the task faced by an adversary to perform modeling
attacks. One approach is to add nonlinearity, such as XOR-
APUFs [6], [7] or usage of Feed Forward Arbiter PUF [6],
[23] and the Lightweight Secure PUF [24]. Unfortunately,
increasing the complexity of model building attacks through
the integration of more non-linear elements also signifi-
cantly decreases the reliability of the PUF [6], [7], [8]. Urich
et al. show that all above strong PUF structures can be
successfully attacked up to a certain size and complexity
when knowing the exact relationship between challenges
and responses [7], [8].
Unlike the previous solutions, two recent proposals [25],
[26] have demonstrated an alternative approach by hiding
the direct relationship between a given challenge C and its
response R. These two proposals in fact make use of the
modeling attacks to build accurate models of APUFs by the
trusted authority—the server—and then destroy the direct
access to query direct challenge and response pairs, where
only distorted challenge and response pairs are exposed
afterwards [25], [26], [27].
In the first proposal [25], [27], the PUF integrated device,
coined as Slender PUF, only reveals a subset of responses
generated on the device for authentication, while the server
can search and match the received substring since it can
emulate PUF responses with its PUF model. In detail, a
subset string of a full-length PUF response is randomly
selected by the Slender and is subsequently padded with a
randomly generated string to ensure the same response bit
length expected from the PUF. The Slender PUF then sends
the post-processed response to the server that uses a specific
recovery method to discover the randomly selected subset
string and decides the authenticity of the Slender PUF held
by the end-user. In the second proposal [26], a decimation
technique is developed to randomly elminiate response bits
at the end-user with a PUF integrated device (prover) and
a corresponding response recovery method is developed at
the server to establish the validity of the response bit string.
In summary, these two approaches efficiently conceal the
challenge and response relationship to prevent an adversary
from building an accurate model of a PUF by observing
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Figure 2. The OB-PUF structure.
those visible CRPs. Although such an obfuscation mecha-
nism in those two works efficiently prevent conventional
modeling attacks usually requiring direct relationship be-
tween a challenge and a response [7], [8]. However, Becker
et al. recently demonstrated that they are vulnerable to Eval-
uation Strategy (ES) based methods, in particular covariance
matrix adaptation ES (CMA-ES) as detailed in Section 2.3.
We can also consider the controlled PUF [28] employing
an obfuscation technique. It, however, requires relatively
expensive on-chip error correction, the storage of associated
helper data and subsequently hash logic for obfuscation,
which are not needed in [26], [25], [27]. In addition, the
employment of helper data actually places the controlled
PUF under potential security threats from ES attacks [10].
A recent work from Yu et al. restricts the available
CRPs to an adversary using a lockdown technique [12].
In this context, an adversary is faced with the diffculty
of gaining enough training materials—CRPs—to learn an
accurate model. This still allows lightweight authentica-
tion applications by upper-bounding available number of
secure authentication rounds over the device’s lifetime.
Notably, this lockdown technique also takes advantage of
the resource-rich server to build underlying APUF models
during the secure enrollment phase, similar to [25], [26],
[27]. Also noting that all works [25], [26], [27], [12] reap
benefits from exploiting on-chip nonce or random number
generator (RNG).
We build upon the desirable features of previous
works [26], [25], [27], [12] such as: i) enrolling the APUF
model during the secure enrollment phase rather character-
izing CRPs and storing them, especially when large number
of authentication rounds are required; ii) obfuscation to
remove direct relationship between CRPs; iii) device nonce.
Our obfuscation method distorts relationship between a
challenge and a response using a latent pattern that can
be reconfigured (nonce). Such a technique results in an
OB-PUF design that: i) shows heuristic security against
most powerful ES attacks [9], [10] ; ii) eschews the need to
restrict number of authentication rounds in [12]; iii) removes
reliance on on-chip error-correction logic, computing and
storing associated helper data and subsequent hashing logic
as in [28].
3 CHALLENGE-RESPONSE OBFUSCATION AND
RECOVERY
Fig. 2 illustrates the overall architecture of our challenge-
response obfuscated PUF—the OB-PUF. The OB-PUF is built
upon the PUF block consisting of nins APUFs that share the
same full length challenge C. The challenge stimulated to
the OB-PUF is a partial challenge COB of k −m bits and the
generated obfuscated response ROB is of nins bits. A partial
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Figure 3. An example of challenge-response obfuscation. The pattern
vector (SC1 ,SR1 ) is randomly chosen by the RNG. The SC1 vector
determines the formation of the full length challenge C1 by controlling
positions and values of the m = 3 bits that can be inserted into a
partial challenge COB. The SR1 vector with length of nins is XOR-ed
with R1. In general, it can be seen that one COB can result in one
of p = 4 possible full length challenges, C1, ...,Cp, and hence one of
p possible corresponding responses, R1, ...,Rp. The response Ri is
further obfuscated by XOR-ing with a specific SRi vector to obtain the
obfuscated response ROBi , according to the selected pattern vector i.
The observable obfuscated responseROB = ROBi , determined by the
chosen pattern vector (SCi ,SRi ), is sent from the OB-PUF. Note pattern
vectors are latent and reconfigurable, specifically, this work focuses on
reconfiguring the inserted values in SC vector.
challenge is directly applied to the challenge-response control
block within the OB-PUF. The random number generator
(RNG) is used to select a pattern vector. A pattern vector
refers to the values and positions of m bits used to insert
into a partial challenge to form a full length challenge, and
the string that is XOR-ed with an nins bits response R from
the PUF block to realize the obfuscated response.
We first use a fixed pattern vector to make the descrip-
tions more readable without affecting analyses on the OB-
PUF except modeling attacks analyses. The elaborate way in
which the pattern vector, more precisely, the inserted values
investigated in this paper, are hidden and reconfigured on
demand by using APUF responses produced within the
pattern vector reconfiguring block will be fully described
in Section 4.6.
As an example, consider an OB-PUF with four pattern
vectors shown in Fig. 3, where the PUF block consists of
four APUFs. A partial challenge is applied to the challenge-
response control block of the OB-PUF. Assuming the RNG
selects pattern vector 1, the full length challenge C1 is
formed by inserting logic values of {‘0’, ‘1’, ‘0’} into the
partial challenge at the respective bit positions of 1, 2, and
3. Subsequently, the formed full length challenge C1 from
the challenge-response control block is applied to the PUF
block. Recall, the PUF block comprises of four basic PUF
instances implemented in parallel. These four basic PUF
instances share the same full length challenge C1 in order
to generate a 4-bit response simultaneously—the reason is
described in Section 4.3. After the response R1 is generated
from the PUF block, it is further processed by the challenge-
response control block. Here R1 is XOR-ed with the string
‘0101’ in order to obtain the response ROB1 . Then ROB1 is
sent out from the challenge-response control block as the
obfuscated response ROB of the OB-PUF.
The central concept behind the challenge-response ob-
fuscation is the hiding of the pattern vector chosen by
the RNG. As a consequence, the full length challenge
Ci, i ∈ {1, ..., p}, and the corresponding response Ri are not
Table 1
Description of parameters
Parameter Description
k Length of a PUF challenge vector (stages of APUF)
nins
Number of PUF instances implemented in
parallel on the PUF block of the OB-PUF
m Number of eliminated challenge bits
p Number of pattern vectors
COB
Partial challenge with length of k −m
bits applied to the OB-PUF
ROB Obfuscated response of nins-bit length from the OB-PUF
n
Number of challenge response pairs needed during
authentication to meet required false acceptance
rate and false rejection rate
nEER
Threshold for obtaining equal false acceptance
rate and false rejection rate given a fixed n
nmismatch
A threshold that the server relies on to compare
the emulated response, R′OB, from the server,
and the received response, ROB, from the
physical OB-PUF, see Definition 4
Ppred
The prediction accuracy of the PUF model
obtained by an adversary
Pmin
The minimum prediction accuracy of thePUF model that
should be achieved by an adversary to break the PUF
only hidden from the adversary but also the server, but only
the server can recover it by implementing the challenge-
response recovery method, which is described in detail in
Section 3.5.
In the following subsections, first, we introduce rele-
vant notations and definitions. Secondly, we introduce the
challenge-response obfuscation employed to obfuscate the full
length challenge applied to the PUF block inside the OB-
PUF and the response from the underlying PUF block.
Thirdly, we present the challenge-response recovery method
to enable the server to discover the selected pattern vector
by observing the obfuscated response, and hence, the obfus-
cated full length challenge and its corresponding response.
3.1 Preliminaries
Before delving into the details and evaluation of the OB-
PUF, we give a number of useful definitions and then
introduce several notations where the parameters used in
the following descriptions are listed in Table 1. As the
Hamming distance (HD) and fractional Hamming distance
(FHD) are often referred to in this work, we define them
below, followed by definitions of the mean of pairwise HD
and FHD.
Definition 1. Hamming distance. For binary strings X1 and
X2 with the same length l, the HD between them is defined
as:
fHD(X1,X2) =
l∑
i=1
X1 ⊕X2. (4)
Definition 2. Fractional Hamming distance. Built upon (4),
the fractional Hamming distance (FHD) is defined as:
fFHD(X1,X2) =
fHD(X1,X2)
l
. (5)
Definition 3. Mean of pairwise HD/FHD. Given a collec-
tion X that consists of many binary strings, the mean of
pairwise HD of X is defined as:
fmeanHD(X ) = mean{fHD(Xi,Xj)}, (6)
where these two binary strings Xi ∈ X ,Xj ∈ X and i 6= j.
5And the mean of pairwise FHD is defined as:
fmeanFHD(X ) = fmeanHD(X )
l
(7)
Now consider the OB-PUF illustrated in Fig. 2 and 3,
formally, we can define a pattern vector as a vector chosen
from a set, {(SCi ;SRi)}, i ∈ {1, ..., p}. Here the SCi ∈ SC ,
where SC = {SC1 , ...,SCp} determines the positions and
values inserted into a partial challenge COB to form a
possible full length challenge Ci. The SRi ∈ SR, where
SR = {SR1 , ...,SRp} and the length of SRi is nins, is the
string that is XOR-ed with the response Ri obtained from
the PUF block in order to gain the obfuscated response.
There are p pattern vectors, therefore, there are p possible
full length challenges given a partial challenge. Then given a
pattern vector, i, the formed full length challenge Ci applied
to the PUF block is from a set C, where C = {C1, ...,Cp}.
Consequently, the corresponding response Ri ∈ R, R =
[R1, ...,Rp], is generated from the PUF block. The obfus-
cated response ROBi from the OB-PUF is a function of
Ri, where ROBi = Ri ⊕ SRi . Therefore, the final output
ROB = ROBi of the OB-PUF is from a collection of ROB,
where ROB = [ROB1 , ...,ROBp ]. In other words, the final
output—the observable obfuscated response—is actually
determined by the randomly selected ith pattern vector.
3.2 Challenge Obfuscation
The partial challenge intentionally eliminates m bits from a
full length challenge. From a machine learning perspective,
not only do we eliminate m features but also eliminate them
from randomly selected positions. When such an incomplete
input feature vector is employed to train a model, the
missing features decrease the accuracy of the learned model.
In Following, we describe the design of pattern vectors and
realization of challenge obfuscation.
As for the OB-PUF, a partial challenge gives p possible
full length challenges, C1, ...,Cp. Hence, there are p possible
responses, R1, ...,Rp. According to our experiments, if the
mean of pairwise HD of possible full length challenges C—
see Definition 3—is small, the mean of pairwise HD of
possible responsesR will also be small.
As an exemplary demonstration, we have randomly
generated 5000 COB and form the four possible full length
challenges according to one extreme case, where we inserted
all values to the first three positions in each pattern vector—
note that we do not insert the values to the positions that are
optimal positions as shown in Fig. 3. We got a 3.1% mean
of pairwise FHD of four possible full length challenges,
consequently, the mean of pairwise FHD of four possible
responses is only 1.1%. In essence, recall (3), this extreme
position selection remains (Φ4(C), ...,Φk (C), 1) for all four
possible full challenge fractures to be same. This creates a
problem. Assume that the OB-PUF does not further imple-
ment response obfuscation and the mean of pairwise HD
of C is very small. Given one possible response Ri ∈ R,
for a COB, is directly exposed as the response of OB-PUF.
Now it does not matter which pattern vector is chosen to
construct a full length challenge, an adversary can select
any possible full length challenge from C and the exposed
Ri to train a model. This is because, by virtue of the
Figure 4. The mean of pairwise FHD of C andR distribution.
small HD between full length challenges in C, the mean
of pairwise HD of possible responses R is also small. In
other words, it is reasonable for an adversary to select any
Cj ∈ C, j ∈ {1, ..., p}, to pair with the observable Ri as a
useful CRP to train a model.
To mitigate the above security concern, the mean of
pairwise HD of possible responses R for a given partial
challenge should be maximized. Alternatively, the mean of
pairwise HD of possible full length challenges C should be
maximized.
Then, it follows that to maximize the mean of pairwise
HD of possible responses R, the pattern vector used to
generate full length challenges should be carefully designed.
The four pattern vectors, p = 4 as an example, listed in
Fig. 3 is one strategy to maximize the mean of pairwise HD
of possible full length challenges C.
A generalized pattern vector design for challenge ob-
fuscation is illustrated in Fig. 5. In Fig. 4, it shows the
distribution of the mean of pairwise FHD of possible full
length challenges C and the distribution of the mean of
pairwise FHD of corresponding responses R. To generate
the results in Fig. 4, we calculate the mean of pairwise FHD
of possible full length challenge C and the corresponding
possible responses R for each randomly generated partial
challenge. The number of randomly generated partial chal-
lenges is 1,000,000, consequently, the distributions of the
mean of pairwise FHD of possible full length challenges C
and the corresponding possible responses R for 1,000,000
partial challenges are acquired, where k = 64 and nins = 64.
It can be observed from Fig. 4 that the mean of pairwise FHD
of possible full length challenges C and the corresponding
possible responses R are always in vicinity of 50%, and,
hence, indicating that the mean of pairwise FHD of C and
R are maximized. Notably, a large mean pairwise FHD of
R—close to 50%—helps increase the ability to discover the
hidden full length challenge by a server or a verifier armed
with a model of OB-PUF as will be discussed in Section 3.5.
3.3 Response Obfuscation
Response obfuscation further increases the mean pairwise
HD of possible responses from an OB-PUF. Most impor-
tantly, it is employed to prevent an adversary with full
access to the OB-PUF possibly discovering and employing
those partial challenges, where the responses generated
from an APUF given a partial challenge is only determined
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Figure 5. Generalized pattern vector design method to maximize the
mean of pairwise FHD of possible full length challenges C given a
randomly selected partial challenge COB.
by delay difference of k − m stages and is agnostic to the
selection of the other m stages.
As a motivating example, consider the first bit—the re-
sponse generated by the first PUF instance—for all possible
full length challenges, C1, ...,Cp, given the same COB, there
is a probability of 12p that the first PUF instance produces
the same response (‘0’/‘1’) for all p possible pattern vectors.
Here, if an adversary has full access to the OB-PUF, then
the adversary can apply the same COB to the same OB-
PUF repeatedly, to observe the first bit, r1, of response R to
discover partial challenges with a response that is agnostic
to the pattern vector. In other words, the response of the
first APUF is only determined by delay difference of k −m
stages. If this occurs, then the first PUF instance keeps pro-
ducing the same response (‘0’/‘1’), and the adversary can
utilize any possible full length challenge given such a partial
challenge and the corresponding response (‘0’/‘1’) to train
a model. As a consequence, through multiple evaluations
of the same partial challenge COB and utilizing those COB
that always generate the same response, an adversary can
sequentially model each APUF instance in the PUF-block.
Response obfuscation is implemented to address such a
scenario. The response obfuscation control involves XOR-
ing Ri with a pre-designed string to generate ROBi , where
ROBi = Ri ⊕ SRi , as illustrated in Fig. 3. The design of SR
obeys two rules: i) maximizing the mean of pairwise HD
of SR to be 50%; and ii) ensuring the percentage of ‘1’ is
close to 50% for any given bit position of SR corresponding
to every pattern vector (see the example pattern vectors in
Fig. 3).
After response obfuscation is implemented, the adver-
sary must guess the randomly selected pattern vector to
derive the response Ri to train a model even if the jth, j ∈
{1, ..., nins} bit in ROBi always presents the same value.
The reason lies in the fact that the selected SRi needs to
be found in order to derive the Ri. However, the selected
SRi is invisible. Hence, those partial challenges that always
generate the same obfuscated responses leak no information
that can be exploited by an adversary to break the OB-PUF.
3.4 Pattern Vector Design
We can see from our discussions above that the security
of challenge-response obfuscation relies on the design and
random selection of pattern vectors. In summary:
1) The challenge obfuscation pattern vector SC must
be designed to maximize the pairwise HD of pos-
sible full length challenges C1, ...,Cp for a given
COB.
2) The response obfuscation pattern vector SR must be
designed to maximize the mean of pairwise HD of
SR to be 50% and to ensure the percentage of ‘1’ in
a given bit position of SR corresponding to every
pattern vector to be approximately 50%.
3.5 Challenge-Response Recovery
When a server receives an obfuscated response, ROB, from
an OB-PUF, the server can emulate all p possible obfuscated
responses R′OB = [R′OB1 , ...,R′OBp ], for a given COB,
according to the pattern vectors known by the server. As
illustrated in Fig. 6, the server compares each emulated
obfuscated response R′OBi , i ∈ {1, ..., p} with the received
ROB from the user and accept if there exists one emulated
obfuscated response R′OBi that matches the received ROB.
The matching criterion is detailed in Section 4.1 along with
the OB-PUF based authentication protocol.
pattern vector 1
pattern vector 2
pattern vector 3
pattern vector 4
ROB'
ROB'
1
2
ROB'
ROB'
3
4
ROB' 1fHD ( ),ROB
ROB' 2fHD ( ),ROB
ROB' 3fHD ( )
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Figure 6. Illustration of challenge-response recovery.
4 AUTHENTICATION APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, first, we summarize a parameter-based au-
thentication protocol applicable to the OB-PUF primitive.
In addition, the authentication protocol can further harness
a server-aided computation method to improve the OB-
PUF’s performance. Next, we introduce the general formula
for establishing the authentication capability of PUFs and
evaluate the crucial parameters, inter-distance and intra-
distance, necessary to assess the authentication capability
of our OB-PUFs. Then we quantitatively analyze the OB-
PUF’s authentication capability. At the end, we detail how
to reconfigure the pattern vectors in authentication applica-
tions.
4.1 Server-Aided Parameter Based Authentication
Authentication Protocol. A variant of parameter-based au-
thentication protocol [26] is described in detail below:
1: A server gains a specific number of CRPs of
each APUF in a PUF block to train a model and
securely stores the parameter model associated
with a given instance of an OB-PUF. This is usu-
ally referred to as the enrollment phase. Then the
direct extraction of CRPs of APUF instances are
destroyed, e.g., via fusing the extraction wires.
2: Whenever the prover requests an authentication
from the server. The server randomly issues a
COB and sends it to the prover. The prover
7applies the COB to the OB-PUF and obtains an
ROB.
3: After receiving ROB from the prover, the server
carries out the authentication by implementing
the challenge-response recovery method. If one
of the emulated obfuscated responses R′OB for a
given COB matches the received obfuscated re-
sponse ROB—see Section 3.5, the authentication
is successful, and the authenticity of the physical
entity is established; otherwise, if none of the
emulated obfuscated responses R′OB matches
to the received ROB, the authentication fails.
A specific COB is used no more than once to
prevent replay attacks.
Notably, this parameter based authentication can further
exploit resourcefulness of the server by implementing the
following server-aided method.
Determining a Match. In the example in Fig. 6, a
match is determined if the criterion fHD(R′OB,ROB) = 0
is satisfied when performing the step 3 of the authenti-
cation protocol. This occurs when the pattern vector that
the server selects for emulation is the same as the pattern
vector randomly chosen in the physical OB-PUF. Otherwise,
if none of the emulated R′OB matches the received ROB.
This authentication around is rejected. In general, a match
criterion does not always require fHD(R′OB,ROB) = 0. As
long as fHD(R′OB,ROB) is lower than a mismatch tolerance
nmismatch defined below, the server can accept the authen-
ticity of the received obfuscated response.
Definition 4. Mismatch tolerance nmismatch.
The nmismatch is the Hamming distance—number of mis-
matching bits—between an emulated obfuscated response
R′OBi and the received obfuscated response ROB tolerated
by a match criterion. A server accepts the received obfus-
cated response ROB if fHD(R′OB,ROB) ≤ nmismatch.
In other words, nmismatch describes tolerated number of
flipped bits between the R′OBi and ROB when the server
compares them. The ROB is accepted when the HD between
one of p possible emulated R′OB and the received ROB is no
more than nmismatch. We will show in Section 4.5 that relax-
ing match criterion by selecting a large mismatch tolerance
in fact expedites the authentication process. Clearly a single
COB and ROB pair, shortly an OB-CRP, is not adequate to
authenticate a large population of OB-PUFs. One solution is
to implement multiple OB-PUF instances sharing the same
COB on a device, but this results into higher area and
power overhead. The alternative approach of using multiple
number of challenge response pairs is more practical, and
is commonly employed by PUF based authentication pro-
tocols [21], [11]. In our authentication protocol, this implies
that steps 2 and 3 are repeated multiple times. The goal with
either approach is to generate adequate number of response
bits to authenticate or identify a large number of OB-PUFs.
4.2 Authentication Capability
Considering our need for multiple rounds or multiple OB-
CRPs, the question that we need to address remains the
number of OB-CRPs required to authenticate or identify an
OB-PUF from a very large population of OB-PUFs.
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Figure 7. Distributions of intra-distance and inter-distance for 32-bit
response.
Starting with a conventional PUF, we can establish the
number of CRPs needed to authenticate a PUF by consider-
ing the inter-distance and intra-distance used to describe
the distribution statistics of PUF responses. We formally
define the inter-distance and intra-distance following Roel’s
work [11].
Definition 5. Inter-distance. The inter-distance is a random
variable describing the distance between two PUF responses
from different PUF instances subjected to the same chal-
lenge, hence,
Dinter = dist(RA; RB) (8)
where RA and RB are two responses from two randomly
selected but distinct PUFs stimulated by the same challenge.
The inter-distance measures the uniqueness of PUFs [11].
Definition 6. Intra-distance. The intra-distance is a random
variable describing the distance between two PUF responses
from the same PUF instance and subjected the same chal-
lenge, hence,
Dintra = dist(R; R
′) (9)
where R and R′ are two distinct responses from a randomly
chosen PUF instance produced using the same challenge re-
evaluated at two distinct times. The intra-distance describes
a PUF’s response reproducibility.
The dist(.; .) function above can be any well-defined
and appropriate distance metric over the responses. In this
paper, responses are always bit vectors and the used dis-
tance metric is Hamming distance or fractional Hamming
distance—see Section 3.2. In Fig. 7, we illustrate the dis-
tribution of the inter-distance and intra-distance of 32-bit
length PUF responses. Considering that the evaluation of
each CRP or each response bit is independent [6], both inter-
and intra-distance distributions are assumed to follow a bi-
nomial distribution, B(n, pˆ), where the binomial probability
estimator of inter- and intra-distance distributions are pˆinter
and pˆintra, respectively [6]. Then pˆinter is the probability that
RA 6= RB , and pˆintra is the probability that R 6= R′ [6].
We are particularly interested in the right tail of intra-
distance distribution and the left tail of inter-distance dis-
tribution, because these two tails describe two undesirable
errors in an authentication application: i) false rejection
rate (FRR); and ii) false acceptance rate (FAR). We can
see that given an n-bit response vector, FAR expresses the
probability of misidentification and therefore a high FAR is a
security weakness in the authentication mechanism. On the
other hand, FRR expresses the probability of misrejection of
an authentic PUF and therefore a high FRR will deem the
authentication scheme impractical. Given both inter- and
8intra-distance follow binomial distributions, the FRR and
FAR can be formally expressed in [21], [11]:
FRR = 1−
nth∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(pˆintra)
i(1− pˆintra)(n−i), (10)
FAR =
nth∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(pˆinter)
i(1− pˆinter)(n−i). (11)
We can easily envision that a larger nth benefits FRR but
increases the FAR, and vice versa. However, high values
for both FRR and FAR are undesirable for authentication.
Therefore, in practice, we want a balance between them.
There exists a value for nth for which both FAR and FRR are
equal. We refer to this value of nth as equal error threshold,
nEER, and when both error rates are equal, we refer to this
as equal error rate (EER) following Roel’s work in [11]. For
a discrete distribution, there may not be a value for nEER
where FAR and FRR are exactly equal, and hence, nEER and
EER are defined as in [11]:
nEER = argmin
nth
{max{FAR(nth),FRR(nth)}}, (12)
EER = max{FAR(nEER),FRR(nEER)}. (13)
Given a PUF class with binomial probability estimator pˆinter
and pˆintra, we can find the minimum number of CRPs, n,
for ensuring an acceptable EER—typically in practice, a
minimum requirement is a value lower than 10−6. During
an OB-PUF authentication, the server sends out n partial
challenges COB and compares the received n obfuscated
responses ROB. Then, to evaluate an adequate value n to
achieve an acceptable EER, we need to statistically evaluate
the pˆintra and pˆinter for our OB-PUF primitive.
4.3 The Binomial Probability Estimator pˆinter of OB-PUF
Consider two 1-bit responses produced by applying the
same challenge to two distinct conventional PUFs that are
randomly chosen from a population. In general, the pˆinter
of conventional PUFs is the probability that these two 1-bit
responses are different. This is normally very close to 50%
since most PUFs can achieve a uniqueness very close to 50%
when the layout is carefully performed. Similarly, the pˆinter
of OB-PUF is the probability that two obfuscated responses
are different, where these two obfuscated responses are gen-
erated by two randomly chosen OB-PUFs from a population
given the same applied partial challenge.
Formally, we can derive a generalized expression for
pˆinter of OB-PUFs. Consider that OB-PUFA will generate a
possible ROBA ∈ [ROBA1 ,ROBA2 , ...,ROBAp ], where p is
the number of pattern vectors. Similarly, the OB-PUFB will
generate a possible ROBB ∈ [ROBB1 ,ROBB2 , ...,ROBBp ].
The pˆinter of OB-PUFs is actually the probability ROBA 6=
ROBB given by:
P (ROBA 6= ROBB)
= P ((ROBA1 6= ROBB) & (ROBA2 6= ROBB),
..., & (ROBAp 6= ROBB))
= P (ROBA1 6= ROBB)P (ROBA2 6= ROBB) (14)
..., P (ROBAp 6= ROBB),
where
P (ROBAi 6= ROBB)
= P ((ROBAi 6= ROBB1) & (ROBAi 6= ROBB2),
..., & (ROBAi 6= ROBBp))
= P (ROBAi 6= ROBB1)P (ROBAi 6= ROBB2)
...P (ROBAi 6= ROBBp), i ∈ {1, 2, ..., p}. (15)
P (ROBAi 6= ROBBj) (16)
= 1− P(ROBAi = ROBBj) for i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., p}.
As for OB-PUFs, the obfuscated response consists of multi-
ple bits, therefore, ROBAi 6= ROBBj actually implies that the
fHD(ROBAi ,ROBBj) > nmismatch. Consequently,
P (ROBAi 6= ROBBj)
= 1− P(fHD(ROBAi ,ROBBj) ≤ nmismatch)
= 1−
nmismatch∑
0
1
2nins
. (17)
Therefore,
P (ROBAi 6= ROBB)
= (1−
nmismatch∑
0
1
2nins
)p , i ∈ {1, 2, ..., p}, (18)
and,
P (ROBA 6= ROBB) = ((1−
nmismatch∑
0
1
2nins
)p)p
= (1−
nmismatch∑
0
1
2nins
)p
2
. (19)
As pˆinter = P (ROBA 6= ROBB), then pˆinter of OB-PUFs
can be formally expressed as:
pˆinter = (1−
nmismatch∑
0
1
2nins
)p
2
. (20)
Based on (20), we can see that smaller number of PUF
instances nins in a PUF block decreases pˆinter. For example,
if nins is one, then the pˆinter is only 124 given p = 2. This
extremely small pˆinter implies that the OB-PUF based au-
thentication mechanism yields undesirably high FAR. For-
tunately, inter-distance can be easily regained by increasing
the number of PUF instances implemented in parallel, and
simultaneously queried by the same full length challenge.
4.4 The Binomial Probability Estimator pˆintra of OB-
PUF
In general, the binomial probability estimator pˆintra of a con-
ventional PUF is actually the probability that two repeatedly
generated 1-bit responses, given the same challenge applied
to the same PUF, are different.
As for an OB-PUF, the pˆintra is the probability that
two repeatedly generated obfuscated responses given the
same full length challenge applied to the same OB-PUF
are different. Considering that an OB-PUF produces an
nins-bit obfuscated response, we can see that pˆintra is ac-
tually the probability of fHD(R1OB,R
2
OB) > nmismatch,
9where the R1OB and R
2
OB are two repeatedly generated
obfuscated responses at two different time instances. How-
ever, it is much easier to first formulate the probability of
fHD(R
1
OB,R
2
OB) ≤ nmismatch given as:
nmistmatch∑
i=0
(
nins
i
)
× (1− pˆpufintra)(nins−i) × (pˆpufintra)
i
. (21)
In (21), to distinguish the pˆintra of OB-PUFs that of the
underlying PUF in the PUF block, we refer to the pˆintra of
an underlying PUF as pˆpufintra.
Then, formally, we can express the binomial probability
estimator of intra-distance of OB-PUF, pˆintra, as:
pˆintra (22)
= 1− P (fHD(R1OB,R2OB) ≤ nmismatch)
= 1−
[
nmistmatch∑
i=0
(
nins
i
)
(1− pˆpufintra)(nins−i)(pˆpufinter)
i
]
.
4.5 Evaluating OB-PUF Authentication Capability
We can quantitatively analyze the FAR and FRR of OB-PUF
when using n OB-CRPs for authentication. According to
(11) and (10), the FAR and FRR are determined by binomial
probability estimators pˆinter and pˆintra, chosen nth and the
number of OB-CRPs n. Notably, the binomial probability
estimators of OB-PUFs, pˆinter and pˆintra, are functions of
OB-PUF implementation parameters nins, p and nmismatch.
Hence, various combinations of these implementation pa-
rameters naturally lead to a family of OB-PUFs with dif-
fering physical features and security features such as au-
thentication capability. Here, it is convenient to express the
resulting family of OB-PUFs as OB-PUF(nins, p, nmismatch).
In Table 2, we give a quantitative evaluation of authenti-
cation power under different configurations of OB-PUF(nins,
p, nmismatch). Here, pˆ
puf
intra is selected as 5% since that is
the worst-case pˆpufintra reported for APUF exposed to 45
◦C
variation of temperature and 2% supply voltage variation
according to the experimental data in [21].
4.5.1 Size of the PUF Block
We can see from Table 2 the required number of OB-CRPs,
n, to achieve a specific EER, e.g., 10−6, decreases as nins
increases. A larger number of PUF instances nins requires a
smaller n, which in turn requires less time for sequentially
sending and receiving those OB-CRPs and thus enabling
faster authentication. However, this approach will result in
higher overhead costs as the silicon area needed to imple-
ment an OB-PUF increases. In practical applications where
authentication period is not of strict concern, selecting a
small value for nins provides a lightweight primitive.
4.5.2 Number of Pattern Vectors
Based on the OB-PUF(4, 2, 0) and OB-PUF(4, 4, 0), we can
see that as the number of pattern vectors p increases, the
number of needed OB-CRPs n increases. This is because the
larger p decreases the inter-distance according to (20), but
from a security perspective, a larger p achieves a higher
security level, because it reduces the probability of an ad-
versary correctly guessing the selected pattern vector, see
Section 5.
Figure 8. pˆinter and pˆintra as a function of nins when (a) nmismatch = 0
under a fixed p = 4, and (b) nmismatch = 1 under a fixed p = 4.
Figure 9. Pattern vectors are reconfigured before authentication session
starts.
4.5.3 Mismatch Tolerance
Considering OB-PUF(16, 4, 0) and OB-PUF(16, 4, 1), we
can see that n can be smaller by using a slightly larger
nmismatch, e.g., nmismatch = 1, recall that nmismatch is the
number of tolerated mismatching bits when comparing an
emulated obfuscated response with the received obfuscated
response—see Determining a Match in Section 4.1. In detail,
setting nmismatch = 1 increases the difference between pˆinter
and pˆintra when nins is large, for example, more than ten as
illustrated in Fig. 8, and in turn expedites the authentication
process. In other words, the authentication period can be
made shorter. Notably, for nins = 16 for both OB-PUF(16, 4,
0) and OB-PUF(16, 4, 1), the authentication period benefits
from setting nmismatch = 1. This improvement can also be
understood from Fig. 7. Consider a fixed n and fixed nth,
when the difference between pˆinter and pˆintra is larger—in
other words, difference between intra-distance and inter-
distance is increased, FAR and FRR will eventually decrease.
Overall, OB-PUFs can be flexibly configured to suit dif-
ferent application scenarios according to their performance
requirements such as time to complete authentication, level
of security and hardware cost constraints. If the authentica-
tion time is a concern, then using a large nins and setting
nmismatch = 1 or even larger is possible. Otherwise, if the
OB-PUF integrated device is resource constrained and the
authentication time is not a strict concern, then using a small
nins, e.g., two, and setting nmismatch = 0 is possible.
4.6 Reconfiguring Latent Pattern Vectors
Now we introduce how we reconfigure the pattern vectors
during an authentication phase. We eschew reliance on
NVMs to store reconfigured pattern vectors by generating
them on demand from the underlying APUFs within the
pattern vector reconfiguring block, as shown in Fig. 2.
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Table 2
The relationship between authentication power and configurations of OB-PUF(nins, p, nmismatch).
EER < 10−6 EER < 10−9 EER < 10−12
OB-PUF(nins, p, nmismatch) n nEER FAR∗ FRR∗ n nEER FAR∗ FRR∗ n nEER FAR∗ FRR∗
OB-PUF(2, 2, 0) 294 57 −6.06 −6.06 465 90 −9.02 −9.06 641 124 −12.02 −12.13
OB-PUF(4, 2, 0) 219 46 −6.05 −6.01 348 73 −9.01 −9.05 478 100 −12.03 −12.00
OB-PUF(4, 4, 0) 599 159 −6.06 −6.02 950 252 −9.04 −9.01 1308 347 −12.03 −12.06
OB-PUF(8, 4, 0) 42 30 −6.14 −6.19 68 48 −9.49 −9.25 92 65 −12.15 −12.27
OB-PUF(8, 4, 1) 58 15 −6.22 −6.19 90 23 −9.14 −9.02 125 32 −12.15 −12.27
OB-PUF(16, 4, 0) 39 36 −7.71 −6.13 57 53 −9.17 −9.14 79 73 −12.64 −12.04
OB-PUF(16, 4, 1) 15 12 −6.43 −6.27 24 19 −9.22 −9.54 32 25 −12.11 −12.16
Note: the ∗ symbol means value is from log10.
Hence, the pattern vectors are only known by the server
and therefore hidden from other parties.
This paper focuses on reconfiguring the inserted values
of the pattern vectors, as shown in Fig. 3, used to form the
full length challenge. It is reminded that all other informa-
tion of the pattern vector such as the inserted positions
and the strings used to obfuscate the responses can also
be reconfigured in a similar manner. As depicted in Fig. 9,
before each authentication session consisting of n OB-CPRs,
the inserted values with bit-length of p ×m are first gener-
ated from the underlying APUFs within the pattern vector
reconfiguring block. The pattern vector reconfiguring block
implements logic to assess all sequentially applied p × m
challenges are different. If any two challenges out of p ×m
challenges are different, then those bits are stored in internal
registers to be used for the current session. Otherwise,
random numbers are filled into the registers. We consider
that the APUFs in charge of reconfiguring pattern vectors
share the same COB with the APUFs underlying the PUF
blocks to simplify the logic implementation in practice, the
difference is that the former APUFs only have k−m stages.
In other words, the COB is the full length challenge of the
APUFs underlying the reconfiguring pattern vectors block.
4.6.1 Preselection of Partial Challenges for Pattern Vector
Generation.
In general, the naturally noisy feature of PUF responses
prevents the stable generation of the inserted values and
on-chip error correction must be applied. However, when a
basic APUF is modeled/learned through a method such as
support vector machines (SVM) [29], the predicted time de-
lay tdif 1 in Eq(1)—standing for the difference in delay time
between the top path and the bottom path of an APUF—
contains two useful information: i) sgn(tdif ) that determines
the binary response; ii) the reliability of this response. If
the tdif is alway far from zero, then a response from such
a challenge can be reproduced with full confidence. Recent
work of Xu et al. [29] shows that judiciously determined
challenges based on a learned statistical APUF model can
generate error free responses even across a wide range of
operating conditions as well as aging effects.
Therefore, the server is able to easily determine p × m
partial challenges COB—noting that the COB is the full
length challenge of the APUFs with k−m stages underlying
the pattern vector reconfiguring block—that always produce
1. The predicted value does not contain the time unit, but it is linear
to the actually delay time as detailed in [29]
error-free responses on demand. We adopt such an error
free response selection method to refresh the inserted values
for reconfiguring all pattern vectors at the beginning of
each authentication session. It is also noticed that such a
reliable response selection method can further be employed
to preselect partial challenges that are used for the following
n OB-CRPs to enable an improved reliability of the OB-
CRPs.
5 SECURITY EVALUATIONS
5.1 Adversary Model
We employ a common adversary model described in [8], [7],
[25] when evaluating OB-PUFs’ security. In summary, the
adversary is allowed to eavesdrop on the communication
channel and arbitrarily apply challenges using the publicly
accessible OB-PUF interface to collect an arbitrary number
of CRPs. The adaversary’s goal is to learn an accurate model
of the OB-PUF using modeling attacks.
We focus on recently revealed CMA-ES based modeling
attacks where a direct relationship between a challenge and
a response is not required [10].Further, CMA-ES attacks
have succeeded where previous learning method, e.g., LR,
has failed, for example, the Slender PUF [10].
5.2 Modeling Attack Test Setup
All the CMA-ES attacks are executed using MATLAB 2012b,
where the CMS-ES code is adopted from [30], and the
processor has an Intel i7-3770CPU@3.4GHz CPU and a 16GB
memory.
5.2.1 OB-CRP Generation
Similar to studies in [8], [7], [23], [9], [10], the CRPs of un-
derlying APUFs are generated through simulations that can
effectively model a physical APUF architecture. The delay
values for each stage in an APUF are randomly produced
following a standard normal distribution. When a specific
response is required, a given challenge C is applied to the
APUF to determine which delay values σ0/1i in each stage
will be selected according to the logic value of ci. Then,
according to the linear additive delay model, the selected
delay values of two electrical signal paths are added up,
separately, and compared with each other to generate a
response bit. Artificially injected noise is not used in the
following attack tests. Therefore, a purely ‘logic’ security
of PUF design is evaluated. In this way, the evaluated
security represents an upper bound on OB-PUF’s resilience
to modeling attacks [8].
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As for generation of an OB-CRP for OB-PUFs, first, a
partial challenge COB is randomly generated. Next, one of
p possible full length challenges C is formed according to a
challenge obfuscation vector SC—determined by a specific
randomly chosen pattern vector as illustrated in Fig. 3. Then
its corresponding response R is produced by applying the
formed full length challenge to the PUF block. As illustrated
in Fig. 3, the obfuscated response ROB is obtained by
XORing a specific response obfuscation vector SR with R.
5.2.2 Criterion for Breaking OB-PUFs
In general, to successfully break a PUF, the prediction error
rate of the learnt PUF model should be less than the pˆintra
of the PUF. In other words, the prediction accuracy of the
learnt model should be higher than 1−pˆintra. We refer to this
minimum prediction accuracy as Pmin and define it formally
for OB-PUF below.
Definition 7. Minimum prediction accuracy requirement.
The Pmin is the minimum prediction accuracy of the learned
PUF model that can be considered to successful break a PUF.
For OB-PUFs, based on (22), Pmin = 1− pˆintra, then Pmin
is expressed as:
Pmin =
nmistmatch∑
i=0
(
nins
i
)
× (1− pˆpufintra)(nins−i)
×(pˆpufintra)
i
,
(23)
where pˆpufintra is the binomial probability estimator of intra-
distance distribution of the underlying PUF, e.g., APUF, in
the PUF block. In the following studies in Section 5, we
use the worst-case pˆpufintra = 5% obtained when an APUF is
exposed to 45◦C variation in temperature and 2% variation
in supply voltage [21].
Then the aim of an adversary is to build a model of an
OB-PUF with predication accuracy that is higher than the
Pmin. If this is achieved, the OB-PUF is broken.
5.3 CMA-ES Attacks on Reconfigurable OB-PUF
Though there are variants of ES algorithms, we follow
Becker’s work [9], [10] using covariance matrix adaptation
ES (CMA-ES) [30].
Overall, there are three fitness metrics in the litera-
ture [9], [10] to achieve ES attacks, they are based on: i)
response Hamming distance, ii) response Hamming weight
and iii) response reliability. Choosing a fitness function or
metric is a key challenge in mounting ES attacks. We start
from the response Hamming distance based fitness metric
following Becker’s work in [9].
5.3.1 Response Hamming Distance based Fitness Metric
To ease understanding of evaluating the fitness of a candi-
date delay time vector, ω, when the reconfigurable pattern
vectors are employed, we first describe how to define a
fitness function under the assumption that pattern vectors
are fixed and publicly known. For each OB-CRP, by knowing
all pattern vectors, an adversary forms all p possible full
length challenges, Ci1, ...,Cip, and, all possible obfuscated
responses R′OBi1 , ...,R
′
OBip
are computed according to the
selected ω and using all the known pattern vectors. Now,
the minimum FHD between all possible computed obfus-
cated responses and the under-attack OB-PUF’s obfuscated
response is evaluated:
fi = min
j=1,...,p
{fHD(R′OBij ,ROBi}). (24)
Then the fitness metric f to evaluate the goodness of can-
didate, ω, is acquired by summing all fi of all OB-CRPs;
smaller the f , fitter the learned PUF model [10].
Notably, the ES algorithm needs to iterate many genera-
tions before reaching the best delay time vectors ω. In each
generation, many children are produced; for each child, it
has a corresponding delay time vector inherited from its
parent(s).
Now considering the implemented reconfigurable pat-
tern vectors during authentication phase, in order to eval-
uate the fitness function in Eq (24), for each child in each
generation, and for each authentication session, the ES algo-
rithm has to first work out the pattern vector by predicting,
then form all possible full length challenges, all based on a
delay time vector of each child in every generation. At the
end, all f for all sessions are summed up and normalized to
form a fitness metric that is applicable to the reconfigurable
OB-PUF.
The crux of reconfigurable pattern vector is the stringent
requirement of predicting correct inserted values by an
adversary. The full length challenge feature has a very high
chance of being greatly different from the correct one if
any bit of the inserted values is erroneous. This can be
observed from Eq (3), where the challenge feature is a
function of all bits in the challenge vector. It seems that
arbitrarily measuring the OB-PUF by the adversary may
not be a good choice to collect OB-CRPs even when the
physical measurements on OB-PUF is allowed. Because,
the adversary is unable to guarantee the p × m inserted
values being error freely generated when arbitrary partial
challenges COB are applied. The p × m error free inserted
values are foundations for correctly evaluating the rest n
OB-CRPs. If the inserted values, thus pattern vectors, are
incorrect, then during the ES attack, the incorrect OB-CRPs
lead to misleading fitness assessments of candidate OB-PUF
models.
In addition, the reconfiguring pattern vector makes the
attack computation time significantly to be increased. With
regarding to a fixed public known pattern vector as in our
conference design [5], the ES algorithm is only required to
compute all possible full length challenges and then form
their corresponding challenge features once. The same chal-
lenge features are applicable for each child in each genera-
tion. When the reconfigured pattern vector is implemented,
such a one-time challenge features computation is no longer
applicable. For each session, each child in each generation,
the challenge features vary. Therefore, ES algorithm has to
recompute the refreshed pattern vector first, then form all
possible full length challenge per authentication session,
then computes their corresponding challenge features. Such
a re-computation of reconfigured pattern vectors and then
challenge features per session is unavoidable for any child
in any generation of the ES algorithm. This recomputation
results into a significantly increased computation time of the
ES attacks when the reconfiguring pattern vector per session
is applied.
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Table 3
Prediction Rate of OB-PUF(2, 2, 0)
#row XORs Nsession Ngeneration n m Ppred; Time
#1 2 100 100 300 3 77.02%; 05:23:11
#2 2 50 100 300 8 68.54%; 02:36:02
#3 2 100 100 300 8 68.81%; 05:14:32
#4 2 100 100 600 8 68.71%; 10:39:06
#5 2 100 400 300 6 74.52%; 20:54:03
NOTE: i) XORs means the number of APUFs in a XOR-APUF within
the pattern vector reconfiguring block to produce pattern vectors. ii)
Time format is hour:minute:second. iii) The number of child in each
generation uses the default setting of CMA-ES algorithm [30].
Table 4
Prediction Rate of OB-PUF(4, 4, 0)
#row XORs Nsession Ngeneration n m Ppred; Time
#1 1 100 100 600 3 76.42%; 14:03:36
#2 2 50 100 600 3 55.74%; 08:30:26
#3 2 50 100 600 6 52.00%; 07:59:05
#4 2 100 100 600 3 56.87%; 16:48:22
#5 2 100 100 600 6 54.42%; 15:34:58
#6 2 100 200 600 3 60.32%; 33:12:38
#7 2 100 200 600 6 55.90%; 32:43:22
#8 2 100 300 600 3 62.40%; 50:10:56
#9 2 100 300 600 6 58.10%; 49:46:33
In the following, we evaluate the security of reconfig-
urable OB-PUFs under CMA-ES attacks.
OB-PUF(2,2,0). We first test OB-PUF(2,2,0), where two
APUFs responses are XORed within the pattern vector
reconfiguring block to reconfigure pattern vectors per ses-
sion. Attack results are shown in Table 3. Considering the
Pmin = 90.25% and the Ppred is around 77%, the OB-
PUF(2,2,0), hence, has not yet been broken. Recall that the
m is the eliminated bits in the full length challenge. The
results indicate that a larger m leads to a lower Ppred. This
relies on the fact that the adversary’s model has a lower
probability of correctly predicting all p×m inserted values
all correct when the m increases. Prediction errors of the
computed p × m inserted values change the full length
challenge feature and consequently increase erroneousness
in the final computed obfuscated responses. This explains
the decreased Ppred from 77.02% when m = 3 to 68.81%
when m = 8. When a larger m such as 6 is used, the predict
accuracy decreases greatly. We can observe this based on
#row 1 and #row 5. From the ES learning perspective, the
reason lies in the hardness of correctly determining all p×m
inserted values, where an inaccurate determination [10].
In addition, under expectations, the computation time
is significantly increased compared with attacking fixed
pattern vectors that only costs around 15 minutes. When
Nsession = 100, Ngeneration = 100 and n = 300—this
is the default setting when performing authentication as
quantified in Table 2, the computation time is significantly
prolonged to more than five hours as shown in #row3.
OB-PUF(4,4,0). We now test OB-PUF(4,4,0). The test
starts with using only a single APUF to produce recon-
figured pattern vectors. In this context, the Ppred is up to
76.42% as shown in #row1 that is close but still lower than
the Pmin of 81.45% according to Eq(23). When a XOR2-APUF
within the pattern vector reconfiguring block is used, the
Ppred is significantly reduced to 56.87%, see #row4. The
reduced Ppred is mainly attributed to the increased erro-
neousness that occurs during the determination of pattern
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Figure 10. The y-axis shows the achieved prediction accuracy Ppred
of the CMA-ES attacks. The targeted accuracy Pmin is around 81.45%
to break the OB-PUF(4,4,0). (a) Progression of five runs of the CMA-ES
attacks. For all runs,Nsession = 100, n = 600 andm = 6 are used. Each
run takes around 67 hours. (b) For run 1, Nsession = 100, n = 1200 and
m = 6 are used. For run 2, Nsession = 200, n = 600 and m = 6 are
used. Each run takes around 140 hours.
vectors by the adversary’s model as a result of the XORing
operation. On the other hand, this result agrees well with
Becker’s view [10] that an obfuscated PUF construction such
as the Slender PUF or the OB-PUF in conjunction with
PUFs already resistant to traditional ML attacks increases its
resistance to CMA-ES attacks. The side product of increased
computation time overhead is confirmed again by observing
the last column.
In Fig. 10 (a), it depicts the progression of fives runs of
the CMA-ES on the OB-PUF(4,4,0). For all runs, Nsession =
100, n = 600 and m = 6. We can see, for all runs, the
Ppred is converges within 100 generations with the first
50 generations leading to an increased Ppred. After that,
increasing the generations does not help improve the Ppred.
This lies on the p×m inserted values, reconfigured per ses-
sion, are hard to be computed all correctly by an adversary,
which eventually misdirects the ES evaluation and disrupts
further optimization [10]. Each run is up to 400 generations
and takes around 67 hours. The Ppred is still far below the
targeted Pmin = 81.45%, which validates the significantly
resilience to CMA-ES attacks when the pattern vector re-
configuration is implemented. Fig. 10 (b) investigates the
Ppred when the Nsession or n is increased, more specifically,
more OB-CRPs are exploited for training. Using more OB-
CRPs has no, at least negligible, improvement of adversary’s
model predication accuracy, which confirms one more time
that reconfigurable latent pattern vectors misdirect the ES
optimization.
We have extensively evaluated the OB-PUF’s security
under the ES attacks using the response Hamming distance
based fitness metric. Next we analyze the response Ham-
ming weight and response reliability based fitness metrics,
respectively.
5.3.2 Response Hamming Weight based Fitness Metric
CMA-ES attacks using response Hamming weight fitness
function have broken the security of the slender PUF [10].
Though OB-PUF and Slender PUF both obfuscate the direct
relationship between a challenge and its response, there is a
major difference between the OB-PUF and Slender PUF that
eliminates the OB-PUF’s vulnerability to CMA-ES attacks
employing the Hamming weight based fitness test. In the
Slender PUF protocol, each authentication session shares
the same random indice that is, to be simplified, alike the
random indice determining which pattern vector is chosen
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in the OB-PUF. But in OB-PUF, the random indice changes
per OB-CRP rather than per session as in the Slender PUF
protocol. In addition, to properly evaluate the Hamming
weight based objective function, one premise is that the nins
should be large enough in order to greatly outperform the
noise effects (equivalent to a high signal to noise ratio, in
short, SNR), which has been pointed out and also verified
in [10]. Generally, to help evaluate the Hamming weight
fitness performance, a nins that is in hundreds magnitude is
necessary, however, the very small nins of OB-PUF is far
way from performing the CMA-ES attacks based on the
Hamming weight fitness that is applicable to the Slender
PUF. Please also note that the Hamming weight of the
obfuscated response ROB is already elaborately designed to
be balanced, detailed in Section 3.3, this further eliminates
the concern of Hamming weight fitness test enabled CMA-
ES attacks.
5.3.3 Response Reliability based Fitness Metric
In [9], the reliability-based CMA-ES attack is applicable to
XOR-APUFs. A proper reliability based fitness to mount
CMA-ES attack on the OB-PUFs has not been figured out.
If somehow, a proper reliability based fitness can be found
for OB-PUF. This attack is still difficult to the reconfigurable
OB-PUF. The main reason is that the correct determination
of inserted values and then full length challenge feature
is still required before performing such a reliability fitness
based ES attacks. In other words, even the response of
‘1’/‘0’ is unnecessary, which full length challenge presents
an unreliable response is still required [10].
5.4 Discussion
It was recognized that employing APUFs as building blocks
becomes very challenging in front of CMA-ES attacks [10]
even that APUFs has extremely attractive properties such as
compact structure and, most importantly, large CRP space.
The reconfigurable OB-PUF serves an initial investigation
of preventing powerful ES attacks. From the designing of
reconfigurable OB-PUF, three hints are learned for future
more efficient constructions: i) forcing the ES to compute
such as the challenge feature in each child and in each
generation, which exploits the uncircumventable process of
the ES algorithm to significantly increase its computation
time, ideally to be exponentially increased; ii) increasing the
number of APUFs in a XOR-APUF, e.g., more than two,
within the pattern vector reconfiguring block can signifi-
cantly increase the OB-PUF’s ML-resilience further, this has
been validated in Table 4. Or increasing the number of p×m
such as such as p = 4, m = 18 to exponentially decrease the
capability of the adversary’s model predicting all pattern
vectors all correct as validated in Table 3 and Table 4; iii)
fully exploiting the uneven access to the underlying PUFs
would be a plausible tool to exploit asymmetrical infor-
mation obtained between the trusted party, e.g., the server
and other party, e.g, adversary. For example, the server has
the capability of generating error free responses on demand
based on the learned statistical model of a basic APUF [29].
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a reconfigurable latent obfus-
cation technique that results into the design of reconfig-
urable OB-PUFs. This is a continuous investigation of a
strong PUF scheme that enables the most desirable PUF-
oriented lightweight entity authentication either using error
correction logic nor a cryptographic algorithm, which has
been keeping pursued for over a decade in the PUF com-
munity [12], [31].
The OB-PUF prevents an adversary carrying out suc-
cessful modeling attacks due to that both pattern vectors
and their selection to form possible full length challenges
are unknown, but still allows a server to successfully au-
thenticate an OB-PUF. In addition, pattern vectors are also
reconfigured on demand and act as one-time pads per
authentication session. We implement the most powerful
modeling attacks to date, CMA-ES attack, to evaluate recon-
figurable OB-PUFs security through extensive case studies,
and demonstrate the significant modeling attack resilience.
The reconfigurable OB-PUF studied in this paper serves as
an very initial PUF designs that show significantly increased
resilience to ES attacks without constraints on the available
authentication rounds as in previous work [12]. We also
summarize several useful hints to suggest future PUF de-
signers to propose more efficient ES attacks resilient PUF
constructions.
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